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Abstract
While there exist extensive literatures on both distributive justice and senior executive pay, and a number of authors (notably 
the French economist Thomas Piketty) have addressed the implications of high pay for distributive justice, the existing litera-
ture fails to address what senior executives themselves think about distributive justice and whether they consider high income 
inequalities to be morally acceptable. We address this gap by analysing a unique dataset comprising the views of over 1000 
senior executives from across the world, which was constructed using a survey instrument designed by the authors based on a 
thought experiment resembling John Rawls’s original position. We report four main findings. First, executives conceptualise 
distributive justice in a pluralistic manner, endorsing different and sometimes apparently conflicting philosophical principles: 
to explain how this plurality can be accounted for we propose a novel field-theory framework for conceptualising beliefs 
about distributive justice. Second, executives support similar philosophical approaches at both society and company levels 
of analysis, thus countering the idea that companies should leave matters of distributive justice exclusively for governments 
to deal with via the tax system. Third, executives believe that they live in societies and work for companies that fall short 
of desirable distributive justice outcomes. Fourth, the distributive justice views of the executives in our sample fall into 
four distinct clusters that are correlated with certain socio-demographic markers. Finally, we note the distinction between 
distributive justice beliefs and behaviours, from which we derive a number of managerial and public policy implications.
Keywords Distributive justice · Empirical research · Executive compensation · High pay · Inequality
Introduction
Over the past two decades, the compensation received by 
those employed at the top of companies (“supermanagers” 
according to Piketty 2014) has risen dramatically, continu-
ing a trend that began in the 1980s. At the same time, the 
incomes of regular employees have more or less stagnated 
in real terms (Willman and Pepper 2020). In combination, 
these two developments have fuelled the now widely held 
belief that our societies, and the companies operating within 
them, have become increasingly unjust (Atkinson 2015).
Within the economics literature, there is an ongoing dis-
cussion as to whether the dramatic rise in wage inequal-
ity can be explained solely by economic factors: for recent 
reviews, see Lemieux et al. (2009) for the United States and 
Bell and Van Reenen (2013) for the UK. From a business 
ethics perspective, most contributions have consequently 
focused on whether the explanations proposed by econo-
mists might render large income inequalities morally justi-
fied or, more precisely, distributively just. Boatright (2009) 
and, more cautiously, Moriarty (2009) answer this question 
in the affirmative; Harris (2009) and Néron (2015) disagree. 
What is missing from the literature is an empirical investi-
gation into what business executives think about distribu-
tive justice, and, by implication, whether they consider high 
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income inequalities to be morally acceptable.1 This article 
aims to fill that gap.
Establishing what senior executives think about distribu-
tive justice matters for at least two reasons. First, senior 
executives play a key role in shaping organisational pay 
policies (Sud and VanSandt 2011) as well as other policies 
that are of interest from the point of view of distributive 
justice. Second, their opinions can significantly affect how 
other employees think about distributional issues (see Schein 
1985|2010). The views of senior executives thus affect both 
the pay policies within their companies and how these poli-
cies are evaluated by others within the firm.
In this article, we present the main findings from a 
research project designed to capture executives’ perspec-
tives on distributive justice by matching their views with 
key philosophical principles. There is an extensive philo-
sophical literature which aims to establish what principles 
a society would have to adopt in the distribution of its eco-
nomic rewards to be recognisable as distributively just (for 
a review, see Konow 2000). We draw upon this literature in 
order to investigate what executives think about distributive 
justice in a philosophically informed manner. Specifically, 
we surveyed over 1000 respondents who work in high status 
leadership positions across the world to collect their views 
about what principles would lead to a fair distribution of 
income. The main objective of our research was to develop 
a thorough understanding of how senior executive conceptu-
alise distributive justice. We sought, in particular, to explore 
the following sets of questions. (1) What philosophical 
principles figure most prominently in business executives’ 
conceptualisations of distributive justice? Are the views of 
most executives based on a single principle, or do executives 
try to accommodate several principles at once? (2) Is dis-
tributive justice seen differently at the level of the company 
as opposed to the level of society? Do executives conceive 
of distributive justice as primarily an organisational issue, 
primarily a societal issue, or do they see it as an issue that 
needs addressing at both levels? (3) Do executives believe 
that the principles that they endorse are enacted in the socie-
ties in which they live and in the companies for which they 
work? How large is any perceived justice deficit? (4) Do 
conceptualisations of distributive justice vary according to 
participants’ demographic characteristics, such as their age, 
gender, income level, or nationality?
In response to (1), we find that business executives 
conceptualise distributive justice in a pluralistic manner, 
endorsing different and sometimes apparently conflicting 
philosophical principles. To explain how this plurality can 
be accounted for, we propose a novel field-theory framework 
for conceptualising pluralistic distributive justice beliefs. 
With regard to (2), we find that business executives support 
similar philosophical approaches at both society and com-
pany levels of analysis, thus countering the idea that compa-
nies should leave matters of distributive justice exclusively 
for governments to deal with via the tax system. With regard 
to (3), we find that executives believe that they live in socie-
ties and work for companies that fall considerably short of 
desirable distributive justice outcomes. Taken together, these 
findings indicate that senior executives do not in general 
believe that the currently prevailing high pay inequalities 
are just and might therefore be expected to endorse smartly 
designed reforms aimed at lowering inequality. In response 
to (4), we find that, while executives’ beliefs about distribu-
tive justice are relatively homogenous across our sample, 
their views nevertheless fall into four distinct clusters that 
are correlated with a number of socio-demographic markers.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In 
the second section, we discuss the normative principles of 
distributive justice upon which our research is based. In the 
third section, we discuss our methodology. In the fourth sec-
tion, we present our findings, which we discuss in the fifth 
section. The sixth section summarises and concludes.
Principles of Distributive Justice
The philosophical literature on distributive justice is vast. 
In designing our survey, our goal was to introduce business 
executives to a range of influential philosophical theories 
about distributive justice that also have intuitive appeal, as 
evidenced by empirical studies from economics, political 
science, and sociology. We included six principles in our 
questionnaire. The first and second principles emphasise 
individual merit as the proper basis for allocating economic 
rewards. The third and fourth concentrate on the significance 
of needs. The fifth and sixth principles stress the impor-
tance of voluntary transactions and economic efficiency. 
We focused on the justice of earnings from employment as 
opposed to the just distribution of wealth or other goods, as 
earnings from employment are a variable that senior execu-
tives can influence through the design of organisational pay 
policies. In what follows, we lay out the philosophical think-
ing behind the principles and the empirical support that they 
receive. For convenience, the six principles are summarised 
in Table 1.1 In other empirical investigations, Magnan and Martin (2019) argue 
that the available data suggest that business executives apply princi-
ples of distributive justice in an incoherent manner so as to create the 
impression that large income inequalities are morally justified. Pep-
per et al. (2015) investigate to what extent executives care about how 
their compensation compares to the compensation of peers.
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First Principle: Desert
The first principle takes as its starting point the empirical 
insight that in the context of production individuals typi-
cally believe that effort and contribution should be rewarded. 
Under experimental conditions, when distributive stakes 
are made available not as “manna from heaven” (Cappelen 
et al. 2007, p. 818), but as the result of participants’ produc-
tive activities, the vast majority of people choose to reward 
effort and contribution by allocating rewards that reflect the 
differential productive inputs of different individuals (see, 
for example, Konow 2000). Consistent with these findings, 
Miller (1992) notes in an early survey of the sociological 
and social psychology literature that most people endorse 
inequalities in income if they reflect differential effort and 
contribution.
While the view that some people deserve to earn more 
than others is widely accepted by the general public, the 
position taken by philosophers tends to be more sceptical 
and nuanced. For example, Scheffler (2003) argues that 
desert is an individualistic concept—what a person deserves 
depends only on facts about him or her; however, distributive 
justice is really a holistic concept—the justice of a given 
person’s share of resources turns on facts about that person 
as well as other people. Rawls (1971|1999) and Dworkin 
(2000) both contend that ability and effort cannot be used to 
determine what different individuals deserve, as inherited 
talent and individual characteristics are morally arbitrary. 
Less sceptically, Sher (1987) and Lamont (1994) provide 
arguments to support the normative force of desert claims.
Second Principle: Equality of Opportunity
The second principle stipulates that a distributively just soci-
ety is characterised by equality of opportunity. In such a 
society, equally talented and hardworking individuals have 
the same opportunities to be appointed to positions that 
come with economic advantages; no one is discriminated 
against because of their gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic 
background, or their membership in some other socially 
salient group. In the philosophical literature, equality of 
opportunity is widely recognised as important for distribu-
tive justice (see, for example, Mason 2006). Equality of 
opportunity is typically considered as a luck egalitarian 
principle of justice. Luck egalitarian theories are founded 
on the thought that differences in individual levels of welfare 
are distributively just only if they are traceable to personal 
choices for which people can be held morally responsible 
(Cohen 1989; Dworkin 2000).
Empirical studies show that many individuals try to con-
trol for luck in the distribution of economic advantages. 
Cappelen et al. (2013a) investigate how agents allocate eco-
nomic gains when an individual’s contribution depends on 
two factors: first, the amount of money that the individual 
chooses to invest, which is under their control; second, the 
rate of return on his or her investment, which is not under 
their control. They find that only around 25% of partici-
pants reward luck by allocating a higher share of the overall 
economic gains to individuals whose investments enjoyed 
a higher rate of return. The other 75% of participants dis-
regard the effects of differential rates of return when mak-
ing their allocative decisions. In a related study, Cappelen 
et al. (2013a) find that many subjects choose to redistribute 
economic gains from better-off to less well-off participants 
when the differences in these participants’ economic welfare 
are due to luck, but not when the differences stem from dif-
ferential choices.
Third Principle: Sufficiency
The principle of sufficiency demands that all members of a 
society should have an income that is high enough to lead 
a dignified life. What this means might vary from soci-
ety to society. At a minimum, to lead a dignified life is to 
have one’s basic needs met and to be able to relate to other 
members of society on equal terms. In the philosophical 
literature, defenders of sufficientarian and related relational 
egalitarian theories of distributive justice include Anderson 
(1999), Frankfurt (1987), and Scheffler (2010).
Empirical studies confirm that many individuals take 
needs into account when they make distributive decisions or 
express their distributive preferences. In a series of empirical 
studies, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) find that partici-
pants favour a principle for the society-wide distribution of 
income that maximises average income subject to a sufficien-
tarian floor constraint. Participants overwhelmingly choose 
a sufficientarian distribution principle when they are asked 
which distributive scheme they would prefer to work under, 
and also when they are asked which scheme they deem fair-
est for society. In Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s experiments, 
participants were also asked to arrive at a consensus agree-
ment in their group discussions, and collectively chose a suf-
ficientarian principle 75% of the time. Similarly, Cappelen 
et al. (2013b) find that needs are taken into consideration in 
an experimental production task in which students from rich 
countries were paired with students from poor countries.
Fourth Principle: Maximin
Rawls (1971|1999) argues that a just society is character-
ised by institutions that promote equal opportunities and that 
redistribute income so as to make the worst-off members of 
society as well off as possible. Rawls arrives at this highly 
redistributive principle (which he calls the “difference prin-
ciple” and we call “maximin”) by arguing that just princi-
ples are those that we would choose as in our self-interest 
What Do Business Executives Think About Distributive Justice? 
1 3
when placed behind a “veil of ignorance”. Behind a veil 
of ignorance, we find ourselves in an “original position” 
where we do not know our identity—we are unaware of our 
socioeconomic status, our talents, our gender, and our eth-
nicity. Rawls argues that in such an original position, we 
would prefer institutions that make the worst-off members 
of our society as well off as possible. As people need to 
remain incentivised to work hard, maximin does not imply 
that everyone should end up with the same after-tax income.
Rawls relies on the assumption that we would be highly 
risk-averse when choosing institutions from behind a veil of 
ignorance. In the absence of such risk aversion, we might 
endorse different allocative principles (see, for example, 
Arrow 1973; Harsanyi 1975, who argue that a risk neutral 
individual would choose to maximise average welfare when 
placed behind a veil of ignorance).
While empirical studies confirm that individuals take 
needs into account when they make distributive decisions, 
the highly redistributive maximin principle finds only lim-
ited empirical support. Michelbach et al. (2003) identify 
behaviours consistent with a Rawlsian maximin principle 
in their experiments, but Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) 
observe that only 4% of their participants endorse a society-
wide distributive principle according to which the worst-off 
members of a society should be made as well off as possi-
ble. Where participants had to reach a collective verdict, not 
one group settled for maximin. Similarly, in a more recent 
study, Bruner (2020) finds little support for the difference 
principle.
Fifth Principle: Efficiency2
The principle of efficiency proceeds from the assumption 
that in a market-based economy the prices paid for different 
types of labour should reflect the relative scarcity of that type 
of labour. This helps to allocate human capital efficiently, so 
that economic output is maximised. Efficiency is consistent 
with a utilitarian approach to distributive justice (Harsanyi 
1975). From a utilitarian perspective, the right allocation of 
resources maximises general welfare. If resources are allo-
cated efficiently, the monetary value of what is produced 
with those resources is maximised. Under certain idealised 
conditions, this plausibly enables the general welfare to be 
maximised also.
Among philosophers, Heath (2014) draws attention to the 
moral relevance of enabling the price mechanism to do its 
work. Like Hayek (1976) before him, Heath argues that mar-
ket prices are neither just nor unjust, and that it is misguided 
to insist that companies should pay their employees a “just” 
income. Instead, wages should be made maximally free from 
distortions, thus reflecting the relative scarcity of labour. 
Heath’s focus on efficiency at the company level does not 
mean that he is opposed to redistribution at the level of soci-
ety; indeed, Heath (2014, p. 10) accepts that redistributive 
policies are appropriate from a justice perspective if they 
help promote general welfare. From an empirical perspec-
tive, Miller (1992) observes that merit-based distributive 
principles are widely endorsed in an economic context not 
only because people believe that effort should be rewarded, 
but also because merit-based principles are thought to pro-
mote efficiency.
Sixth Principle: Entitlement
The sixth principle presumes that individuals are morally 
entitled to whatever income is voluntarily transferred to 
them. In the philosophical literature, this libertarian theory 
of entitlement is associated with Nozick (1974). He argues 
that, if there is a just starting point, then there can be nothing 
unjust about an unequal allocation resulting from a series 
of voluntary transfers. Moreover, if wealth that arises from 
voluntary transfers is appropriated by the state, then the state 
is unjustly depriving citizens of goods to which they are 
entitled.
Libertarian entitlement ideas receive some indirect 
empirical support. When the rules of experiments allow 
subjects to keep the total payoff to themselves, a significant 
proportion choose to hold on to the lion’s share of the pay-
off. In many experiments, up to a third of individuals act in 
a narrowly self-interested manner (see, for example Cap-
pelen et al. 2007, p. 824; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 2004, p. 
109; Krawczyk 2010, p. 136). On one interpretation of their 
behaviour, these individuals simply do not care about dis-
tributive justice, and maximise gains to themselves without 
feeling constrained by considerations of fairness. On another 
more libertarian interpretation, these individuals believe that 
they are morally entitled to keep everything to themselves 
because doing so is a permissible alternative that is offered 
to them under the rules of the experiment.
Methodology
Data Collection
The data for our study were collected with the help of a 
market research company and a professional services firm. 
Together they had access to a large panel of senior execu-
tives from around the world. The market research com-
pany was commissioned to collect data based on a list of 
pre-selection criteria (job title, earnings, industry sector, 
2 The reference is to Kaldor–Hicks efficiency. An allocation is 
Kaldor–Hicks efficient if no reallocation is possible that would create 
more overall gains than losses, as measured in monetary terms.
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company size, nationality, and country of residence) with a 
view to ensuring that only “senior business executives” as 
defined for the purposes of the study were included in the 
sample.3 A panel-screener questionnaire was used to ensure 
that respondents who did not meet the pre-selection criteria 
were selected out. Quotas were agreed in advance to ensure 
that the sample was broadly representative of different ages, 
Table 2  Demographics Variable n % All participants 
n = 1123
n %
Job title Industry sector
 CEO/President/MD 94 8.37  Forestry, Paper and Packaging 7 0.62
 Other C-level Executive 154 13.71  Government and Public Sector 55 4.90
 SVP/VP/Director 875 77.92  Healthcare 48 4.27
Age  Hospitality and Leisure 16 1.42
 Under 35 247 21.99  Industrial Manufacturing 64 5.70
 35–39 232 20.66  Insurance 24 2.14
 40–44 138 12.29  Metals 8 0.71
 45–49 161 14.34  Oil and Gas 12 1.07
 50–54 122 10.86  Pharmaceuticals 38 3.38
 55–59 89 7.93  Retail and Consumer 69 6.14
 60–64 57 5.08  Technology 176 15.67
 65 and over 23 2.05  Transport and Logistics 44 3.92
 Not disclosed 54 4.81  Other 110 9.80
Gender Company ownership
 Male 721 64.20  Listed public company 486 43.28
 Female 342 30.45  Private limited company 440 39.18
 Not disclosed 60 5.34  State-owned enterprise 85 7.57
Indicative total earnings  Other 112 9.97
 $125,000–$149,000 389 34.64 Country
 $150,000–$349,000 317 28.23  United States 120 10.69
 $350,000–$724,999 141 12.56  United Kingdom 100 8.90
 $725,000–$999,999 58 5.16  France 35 3.12
  ≥ $1,000,000 68 6.06  The Netherlands 72 6.41
 Not disclosed 150 13.36  Switzerland 81 7.21
Industry sector  Germany 102 9.08
 Aerospace 3 0.27  Spain 31 2.76
 Defense 11 0.98  Russia 50 4.45
 Asset Management 16 1.42  Poland 30 2.67
 Automotive 28 2.49  Brazil 74 6.59
 Banking and Capital Markets 61 5.43  Mexico 35 3.12
 Business Services 76 6.77  China 49 4.54
 Capital and Infrastructure 8 0.71  India 54 4.81
 Chemicals 21 1.87  Australia 35 3.12
 Communications 28 2.49  Middle East 31 2.76
 Energy, Utilities, Mining 45 4.01  South Africa 41 3.65
 Engineering and Const 63 5.61  Canada 33 2.94
 Entertainment and Media 16 1.42  Other 150 13.18
 Financial Services 76 6.77 Total 1123 100.00
3 We define “senior business executive” by reference to job titles and 
levels of remuneration. Relevant job titles include “CEO”, “Presi-
dent”. “Managing director”, other “C”-level positions, “Senior vice- president”, “Vice-president”, and “Director”. The indicative earnings 
threshold was US$125,000 or its local country equivalent.
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genders, industry sectors, and nationalities. The data were 
collected using an online survey during the period of Octo-
ber 2016 to January 2017, and then handed, anonymised, 
to the researchers in raw form for cleaning and analysis. 
Detailed demographic information about the sample is con-
tained in Table 2. While data based on quota sampling can-
not necessarily be guaranteed to be representative of the 
underlying population, there is some justification for using 
quota sampling given that high-level business executives 
are notoriously difficult to access (see Pettigrew 1992). Our 
sample is quite large (n = 1123), and well diversified, allow-
ing for meaningful analysis.
Survey Design
To encourage executives to think impartially about questions 
of distributive justice, thus mitigating the effect of self-serv-
ing biases, we asked participants to engage in the following 
thought experiment before answering the questionnaire:
Suppose that from tomorrow morning onwards you 
find yourself in an imaginary society where the skills 
and talents that are relevant to economic prosperity 
are very different from the ones that you are currently 
familiar with. In this society you might, for example, 
have a successful career if you are able to carry heavy 
objects over large distances, or if you are prepared to 
perform monotonous tasks for hours at a time. Skills 
and knowledge may also be rewarded in this imaginary 
society – or they may not be – the point is that you 
don’t know when making your decisions.
This thought experiment was designed to resemble Rawls’s 
original position. Unlike Rawls, we did not ask respondents 
to imagine themselves as stripped of all knowledge about 
their particular identities. We asked them instead to imag-
ine waking up into a strange world where their skills and 
talents might suddenly be useless. We believe that this sec-
ond imaginary feat is easier to accomplish than the one that 
Rawls invites us to perform in his thought experiment. We 
preferred a Rawlsian “behind the veil” approach to a Smith-
ian “impartial spectator” because we wanted to emphasise 
our respondents’ roles as subjects of the enquiry, rather 
than, for example, as policy advisers to a hypothetical state 
government.4
Our survey centred on the six principles of distributive 
justice described in the second section above. For each of 
the six principles, we provided a key claim and a rationale 
to introduce the principles to the survey participants. The 
principles, together with their key claims and rationales, are 
summarised in Table 1. In the questionnaire, the principles 
were assigned a random order and given neutral labels such 
as “Principle A” or “Principle B”. For each principle, we 
asked the respondents to what extent they agreed with each 
of the following three statements:
(1) “I would want an imaginary society that I might have 
to find my place in to be governed in accordance with 
this principle”;
(2) “A society governed by this principle would be a just 
society”;
(3) “The society that I currently live in is governed by this 
principle”.
Participants were given the option to “strongly agree”, 
“agree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree” or 
“strongly disagree” with the different statements. In the 
second part of the questionnaire, we proceeded in a similar 
way, but asked participants to what extent they endorsed the 
different principles of justice as governing the distribution 
of income at company level. The order in which the different 
principles were presented was altered in the second part of 
the questionnaire to mitigate order effects. We also changed 
the terminology from “principles” to “statements” to make 
pairings between the first and second parts of the question-
naire less obvious.
In the third part of the questionnaire, we provided the 
following preamble to the questions:
Some commentators argue that ethical questions about 
the distribution of income are matters for governments 
to address, if at all, for example through the tax and 
welfare systems in society, and that corporations 
should only concern themselves with efficiency, profit-
ability, and maximizing shareholder value. Other com-
mentators argue that employees are also stakeholders 
in the corporation and that senior managers have to 
ensure that all organizational policies and processes, 
including those relating to pay and performance, are 
demonstrably fair. This section asks a number of ques-
tions about your views on these issues.
Participants were invited to respond to a number of proposi-
tions such as “corporations should take into account prin-
ciples of fairness and distributive justice when determining 
their pay strategies”, and “questions of distributive justice 
should be settled exclusively at the level of society as a 
whole rather than also at the level of individual corpora-
tions”. Respondents were also given the option of provid-
ing narrative comments, which we translated, tabulated, and 
analysed by reference to the framework developed on the 
basis of our quantitative empirical work.
4 For a discussion of Adam Smith’s device of the “impartial specta-
tor”, see Raphael (2007). For a critical discussion and comparison of 
the two approaches to eliciting justice judgments, see Bruner and Lin-
dauer (2020).
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The final part of the questionnaire asked participants 
about their age, gender, nationality, main country of resi-
dence, indicative earnings from employment, the industry 
sector in which they work, the type of company they work 
for (i.e. public company, private company, or state-owned 
enterprise), their role within the company, and the size of 
company (in terms of turnover and number of employees).5
Use of a Survey Over a Lab‑Based Experiment
Much empirical research on distributive justice is conducted 
“in the lab”—economists in particular tend to favour lab-
based experiments over other methods of data collection. 
We chose a survey over a lab-based experiment for a number 
of reasons.6
The principal reason is a pragmatic one. Our objective 
was to reach a large international audience of high-level 
executives in order to study the distributive justice views 
of global business elites. It would have been extraordinarily 
difficult, if not impossible, to study such an audience in a 
behavioural laboratory. Thus, if lab-based studies are the 
only way of eliciting distributive justice views, our project 
would simply not have been feasible. In any case, while lab-
based experiments have crucial advantages if the aim is to 
study behaviour, our objective was to study and concep-
tualise the distributive justice beliefs of senior executives, 
not to predict behaviour. Of course, for a perfectly virtuous 
individual, we might assume that there will be a close con-
nection between behaviour and beliefs, so that their beliefs 
about distributive justice will guide their actions. However, 
while a less than perfectly virtuous individual might whole-
heartedly believe that everyone should have an income suf-
ficiently high to live a dignified life, they might at the same 
time struggle to give away part of their income to raise the 
standard of those finding it difficult to make ends meet. This 
potential gap between beliefs and behaviours gives rise to 
one of the practical implications of our study—distribu-
tive justice outcomes in society and organisations might be 
modified if the gap between beliefs and behaviours could be 
closed. We discuss this further below under the sub-heading 
“managerial and public policy implications”.
All this is not to say that experiments have no role to 
play in studying individuals’ justice views. Consider the fact 
that our survey uses a thought experiment resembling John 
Rawls’s original position to elicit distributive justice views. 
According to Rawls’s experiment, subjects are asked to 
imaginarily place themselves in an “original position” where 
they do not know their social position—they are unaware of 
their skills, talents, family background, ethnicity, religious 
views, etc. Stripped of this knowledge, they are then asked 
to choose those rules for the distribution of resources that 
they would consider in their self-interest. Rawls thinks that 
the rules that we choose as in our self-interest when placed 
in an original position are rules of justice. In our survey, 
we merely invite participants to engage in such a thought 
experiment. In the lab, by contrast, it might be easier to 
place subjects in an original position—it can be explained 
to them in more detail that their identity is veiled, that it 
will be revealed after they choose some principle for the 
distribution of resources, and that the reward that they will 
take home will vary in accordance with the principle that 
they have chosen as well as the identity that will ultimately 
be revealed (see, for example, Frohlich and Oppenheimer 
1992). It might suggest that an experimental setup is prefer-
able when a Rawlsian thought experiment is used. However, 
we do not believe that this is necessarily the case. In an 
experimental situation, individuals typically interact with 
strangers on a one-off (or limited repeat) basis and the sums 
at stake are normally trivial. But distributive justice is con-
cerned with repeated interactions between the members of 
a group or society and the distribution of large sums that 
determine how individuals’ lives are going. It would be 
perfectly consistent in an experimental setup to express a 
“winner-takes-it-all” mentality while arguing for a safety 
net at the level of society.
In light of these considerations, we believe that a survey 
compares favourably with an experimental approach in dis-
covering distributive justice beliefs. We included a small test 
to check whether our thought experiment worked. For each 
principle of justice, we asked the participants to what extent 
they endorsed it as just, and to what extent they preferred it 
as being in their interest. If the thought experiment worked, 
there should be no difference between the two answers. The 
answers of our participants were, indeed, highly correlated 
(r = 0.56 at society level of analysis and r = 0.84 at company 
level of analysis).
Findings
Our research is exploratory, meaning that we touch on many 
issues in order to investigate existing theories, to seek new 
hypotheses, and to see the overall shape of the phenomena 
(Bewley 1999). We carried out a battery of statistical tests 
looking for patterns in the data, which we then compared 
with narrative responses to the survey. We debated our 
5 In practice, the data on “nationality” and “country of residence” 
were highly correlated, so we ignored country of residence and 
focused only on nationality. “Role” was used only to determine sam-
ple selection and was not further analysed. The data on company size 
were of variable quality and were therefore discarded, although the 
panel screener ensured that only companies with turnover in excess of 
$1500 m and more than 500 employees were included in the sample.
6 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for asking us to explain 
and justify our use of a survey.
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Table 3  Descriptive statistics—
preferred (normative) and 
perceived (actual) principles of 
justice
Response Equality of 
opportunity
Desert Sufficiency Maximin Efficiency Entitlement
(n = 1123) n % n % n % n % n % n %
Society preferred
 Strongly disagree 17 1.5 14 1.2 35 3.1 107 9.5 31 2.8 93 8.3
 Disagree 48 4.3 60 5.3 132 11.8 257 22.9 140 12.5 273 24.3
 Neutral 87 7.7 121 10.8 140 12.5 175 15.6 188 16.7 210 18.7
 Agree 357 31.8 512 45.6 454 40.4 323 28.8 481 42.8 327 29.1
 Strongly agree 614 54.7 416 37.0 362 32.2 261 23.2 283 25.2 220 19.6
 Mean score 0.67 0.56 0.43 0.17 0.38 0.14
 Std. Dev 0.45 0.44 0.54 0.66 0.53 0.63
Company preferred
 Strongly disagree 14 1.2 4 0.4 17 1.5 102 9.08 11 1.0 93 8.3
 Disagree 85 7.6 21 1.9 66 5.9 285 25.38 82 7.3 263 23.4
 Neutral 107 9.5 81 7.2 106 9.4 230 20.48 177 15.8 205 18.3
 Agree 445 39.6 433 38.6 494 44.0 331 29.47 520 46.3 341 30.4
 Strongly agree 472 42.0 584 52.0 440 39.2 175 15.58 333 29.7 221 19.7
 Mean score 0.57 0.70 0.57 0.11 0.48 0.15
 Std. Dev 0.48 0.37 0.46 0.64 0.46 0.63
Society perceived
 Strongly disagree 144 12.8 74 6.6 214 19.1 196 17.5 85 7.6 144 12.8
 Disagree 330 29.4 269 23.9 324 28.9 338 30.1 294 26.2 304 27.1
 Neutral 227 20.2 231 20.6 180 16.0 229 20.4 281 25.0 280 24.9
 Agree 271 24.1 378 33.7 276 24.6 240 21.4 337 30.0 270 24.0
 Strongly agree 151 13.5 171 15.2 129 11.5 120 10.6 126 11.2 125 11.1
 Mean score  − 0.02 0.13  − 0.10  − 0.11 0.06  − 0.03
 Std. Dev 0.63 0.59 0.66 0.63 0.57 0.61
Company perceived
 Strongly disagree 89 7.9 38 3.4 169 15.05 78 6.9 41 3.7 75 6.7
 Disagree 263 23.4 156 13.9 372 33.13 203 18.1 199 17.7 212 18.9
 Neutral 251 22.4 236 21.0 254 22.62 256 22.8 336 29.9 294 26.2
 Agree 374 33.3 488 43.5 224 19.95 417 37.1 407 36.2 397 35.4
 Strongly agree 146 13.0 205 18.3 104 9.26 169 15.1 140 12.5 145 12.9
 Mean score 0.10 0.30 0.18  − 0.12 0.18 0.14
 Std. Dev 0.58 0.52 0.57 0.60 0.51 0.56
Table 4  Empirical results—
preferred (normative) and 
perceived (actual) principles of 
justice
**Statistically significant for p < 0.01
Range + 1 to − 1 Equality of 
opportunity
Desert Sufficiency Maximin Efficiency Entitlement
Preferred
 (1) Society 0.67 0.56 0.43 0.17 0.38 0.14
 (2) Company 0.57 0.70 0.57 0.11 0.48 0.15
 (3) Correlation (r) 0.41** 0.38** 0.41** 0.51** 0.45** 0.48**
Perceived
 (4) Society  − 0.02 0.13  − 0.10  − 0.11 0.06  − 0.03
 (5) Company 0.10 0.30 0.18  − 0.12 0.18 0.14
 (6) Correlation (r) 0.55** 0.45** 0.44** 0.53** 0.49** 0.34**
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results with practitioners and other academics in a variety 
of forums, and took account of these discussions in devel-
oping our conclusions. We report below the main results of 
our analysis.
Descriptive statistics are set out in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 
provides a detailed overview of the agreement and disagree-
ment that the participants expressed. Table 4 sets out average 
levels of agreement by principle at society and company 
levels. We coded participants’ level of agreement as “ + 1” 
(strongly agree with a principle), “ + 0.5” (agree with the 
principle), “0” (neither agree nor disagree), “ − 0.5” (disa-
gree), and “ − 1” (strongly disagree). Thus, the higher the 
average for a principle, the more agreement exists among 
the respondents that the principle expresses a distributive 
justice ideal.
Preferred Principles of Justice at Society 
and at Company Level
The approval ratings for the different principles set out in 
rows (1) and (2) of Table 4 show that at society level the two 
merit-based principles of equality of opportunity and desert 
have the highest ratings. These are followed by sufficiency 
and efficiency. Less than half of all respondents endorse 
maximin or entitlement. At company level, as at society 
level, the two merit-based principles have the highest levels 
of approval, although the order is reversed. Sufficiency and 
efficiency again follow, while entitlement and maximin lag 
behind. In summary, while the picture at company level is 
similar to the picture at society level, equality of opportunity 
has a higher approval rating at society level, desert at com-
pany level, and sufficiency and efficiency are both endorsed 
more strongly by participants at company level. Row (3) in 
Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between 
the endorsement of any given principle at society and at 
company level.
Perceived Justice Shortfall
Rows (4) and (5) in Table 4 provide corresponding ratings 
for perceived principles of justice. The gap between the 
extent to which principles of distributive justice are endorsed 
as ideals and the extent to which they are perceived to gov-
ern the actual distribution of income is evident by comparing 
the ratings in rows (1) with (4) and (2) with (5). We can see 
that the principles that are considered to be most morally 
relevant (i.e. desert, equality of opportunity, and sufficiency) 
are not considered to be strong governing principles in the 
societies in which the respondents live or the companies for 
which they work. In particular, while most respondents agree 
that a society governed by equality of opportunity or desert 
would be distributively just, less than half believe that the 
societies in which they live are governed by either of these 
principles. Conversely, for the principles that are generally 
considered to be less relevant (maximin and entitlement) the 
distribution of responses is much more similar in the nor-
mative versus actual cases at society level. Much the same 
pattern of results appears at company level.
Pluralism and Clustering
Table 5 shows the extent to which respondents’ conceptu-
alisations of distributive justice are pluralistic. Specifically, 
we count how many principles are strongly or very strongly 
endorsed by a respondent. At both society and at company 
levels, there is pronounced pluralism, with respondents 
showing agreement with multiple principles.
To understand the plurality in respondents’ views in more 
detail, we asked respondents to rank order their preferences 
and performed a cluster analysis of the ranked data. The 
forced ranking of preferences was highly correlated with the 
approval ratings (r = 0.93). The cluster analysis involved par-
titioning the observations with the aim of uncovering groups 
of homogeneous observations. To determine the clusters, we 
used a k-mean algorithm, which involves the iterative cal-
culation of the mean of each cluster (Everitt et al. 2001). As 
each new observation is allocated to a cluster, the cluster’s 
mean is recomputed. Multiple passes are made through a 
dataset, allowing observations to change cluster membership 
based on their distance from the recomputed cluster mean. 
The algorithm stops when no observations change clusters. 
To determine the optimum number of clusters, we first ran 
the algorithm with multiple numbers of clusters (1 to 20) 
and, for each cluster solution, calculated the within-cluster 
sum of squares (WSS) and the corresponding proportional 
reduction of error (PRE). The plotting of WSS and PRE 
revealed a solution of four clusters. The clusters are pre-
sented in Table 6. As the cluster analysis is based on ranked 
data (1 = most preferred, 6 = least preferred principle), the 
lower the value corresponding to a particular principle, the 
higher the relative preference towards that principle.
Cluster 1, a group of respondents we label as “relational 
egalitarians”, is characterised by a relatively high level of 
Table 5  Pluralism in views about distributive justice
Number of principles 
supported
Society Company
n % n %
0 28 2.49 28 2.49
1 55 4.90 38 3.38
2 112 9.97 102 9.08
3 228 20.30 218 19.41
4 289 25.73 274 24.40
5 176 15.67 237 21.10
6 235 20.93 226 20.12
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endorsement of equality of opportunity and sufficiency. 
Cluster 2, which we call “meritocrats”, is characterised by a 
relatively high preference for desert, as well as for equality 
of opportunity and sufficiency. Cluster 3, labelled “welfare 
liberals”, had a relatively high level of endorsement of the 
two needs-based principles, sufficiency and maximin, in 
addition to a high preference for desert. Cluster 4, labelled 
“free-marketeers”, emphasises desert, economic efficiency, 
and equality of opportunity. Interestingly, entitlement did not 
feature significantly in any of the clusters. Cluster 1 (rela-
tional egalitarians) was noticeably smaller than the other 
three clusters, which are broadly of equal size.
We also investigated the extent to which the distribution 
of socio-demographic characteristics varies across clusters. 
Specifically, we calculated χ2s to compare observed age, 
gender, income, nationality, industry sector, and type of 
company for each cluster with expected data for the whole 
sample. The χ2 tests in Table 7 show the statistically signifi-
cant associations which we found.
Qualitative Data
Of 1123 participants, 413 provided narrative comments 
on their answers to the survey. We were unable to reliably 
interpret 115 of these comments, and a further 70 were not 
relevant to considerations of distributive justice, leaving 228 
useable comments. Of these, 161 refer exclusively to the 
society level of analysis, 23 refer exclusively to the company 
level of analysis, and 44 make reference to both. These data 
were analysed and assigned to one of the six principles of 
justice. 65 comments are primarily supportive of desert, 61 
of equality of opportunity, 53 of sufficiency, 32 of efficiency, 
25 of entitlement, and 14 of maximin. These proportions are 
broadly in line with the quantitative data results. Exemplary 
quotes are provided in the “Discussion” section.
Discussion
We structure the discussion of our findings around the four 
sets of research questions set out in the introduction.
Preferred Principles of Justice at Society 
and at Company Level
Both at society and at company level, the three principles 
that are most widely endorsed are the merit-based princi-
ples of desert and equality of opportunity, combined with 
the needs-based principle of sufficiency. Of the remaining 
principles, only efficiency has significant support from par-
ticipants. The majority view of justice that emerges, both at 
society and at company level, is that differences in income 
should reflect differential effort and individual productivity, 
with the proviso that everyone ought to receive an income 
that is sufficiently high to live a dignified life.
Desert and equality of opportunity are natural allies—if 
some individuals are discriminated against because they are 
members of a particular social group, it is unlikely that dif-
ferential earnings will reliably track deserved contributions. 
The third most highly endorsed principle of sufficiency can 
be interpreted either as a constraint on merit-based princi-
ples or as consistent with a particular interpretation of what 
Table 6  Cluster analysis
*Statistically significant for p < 0.1
Cluster n Equality of 
opportunity
Desert Sufficiency Maximin Efficiency Entitlement
Relational egalitarians 1 193 2.271* 5.182 2.447* 3.147 3.529 4.424
Meritocrats 2 305 2.018* 2.193* 2.122* 5.131 4.232 5.303
Welfare liberals 3 299 5.272 1.890* 2.442* 3.023* 4.123 4.249
Free-marketeers 4 326 2.037* 1.963* 4.708 5.234 2.662* 4.397
Table 7  Comparison of cluster 
demographics
*Statistically significant for p < 0.1, **statistically significant for p < 0.01
Gender Age Nationality Income Industry Owner-
ship
χ2 df χ2 df χ2 df χ2 df χ2 df χ2 df
Relational egalitarians 3.1 2 7.2 6 17.7 16 5.4 5 18.6 25 4.9 3
Meritocrats 1.0 2 28.1** 6 18.0 16 9.6 5 18.4 25 1.6 3
Welfare liberals 1.2 2 44.1** 6 47.4** 16 36.6** 5 35.0* 25 2.0 3
Free-marketeers 3.2 2 8.4 6 47.6** 16 5.0 5 20.3 25 2.1 3
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constitutes “merit”. If the former, sufficiency becomes rel-
evant whenever an individual’s contribution is too small to 
allow him or her to receive an income that is high enough to 
live a decent life. In these circumstances, considerations of 
need trump considerations of desert as a matter of justice. 
If the latter, sufficiency is consistent with a merit-based for-
mulation according to which everyone who contributes to 
society has a right to receive an income that would allow 
them to live a dignified life. Our data suggest that many 
executives favour this second interpretation of sufficiency. 
Note, in particular, that the approval index for sufficiency is 
significantly higher at the company level than at the level of 
society. One explanation for this difference is that executives 
think of all company employees, but not of all members of 
society, as socially productive.
Pluralism in Executives’ Conceptions of Distributive 
Justice
Both at society and at company level, a large percentage of 
executives agree or strongly agree with three or more prin-
ciples of distributive justice. Around 20% of all executives 
endorse all six principles of justice. Only a small percentage 
agree with only one principle. Participants’ conceptualisa-
tions of distributive justice are therefore notably pluralistic.
At first sight, this pronounced pluralism in executives’ 
views is rather surprising. One possible explanation is 
that our respondents expressed incoherent views, ticking 
boxes more or less at random.7 While we cannot exclude 
this possibility, we are not inclined to give it much weight. 
After all, our respondents were all highly motivated—they 
participated voluntarily, were prepared to complete a long 
and complex questionnaire which required a great deal of 
thought, and were free to exit the survey without completing 
it. There was, moreover, a high level of consistency between 
the approval ratings and forced rankings, and both the cluster 
analysis and our analysis of the qualitative responses suggest 
a good deal of coherence in the views being expressed. Nev-
ertheless, while it seems relatively unproblematic to combine 
merit- with either needs- or free market-based principles to 
form coherent pluralistic conceptions of distributive justice, 
it is less clear how more than a fifth of all respondents felt 
that they could consistently endorse all six principles. To 
do so is necessarily to endorse a laissez-faire approach to 
distributive justice, while at the same time recognising that 
considerations of need have validity as well. Prima facie, 
this seems contradictory. When defending his entitlement 
theory of distributive justice, Nozick (1974) contrasts the 
domain of justice with the domain of charity, and argues that 
considerations of need fall into the charitable domain. Thus, 
as far as Nozick is concerned, entitlement theory leaves no 
room for needs-based considerations. Why might so many 
respondents to our survey have felt otherwise?
We make progress in resolving this puzzle if we accept 
that respecting Nozickian entitlements might, to some 
extent, be necessary to incentivise people to develop their 
talents and to exert effort in a socially productive way, 
thus contributing to the economic output of their society. 
A higher economic output will, in turn, allow a society to 
improve the fate of its worse-off members. It follows that, 
even if someone thinks that distributive justice should aim 
exclusively at meeting human needs, they might neverthe-
less believe that respecting Nozickian entitlements can be 
instrumentally important in the pursuit of justice.8 A simi-
lar argument applies a fortiori to the principle of efficiency. 
Rawls recognised this fact when he devised the difference 
principle: he explicitly accepts that some inequalities are 
likely be to the benefit of the worst-off members of a society. 
But considerations of Nozickian entitlements need not be put 
at the service of needs-based considerations in a pluralistic 
conception of justice that combines both. Despite appear-
ances to the contrary, it is perfectly coherent to indepen-
dently value both the satisfaction of human need as well as 
to the non-interference with outcomes that are the result of 
voluntary transactions. To give an example, someone might 
believe that a society is distributively just as long as (1) eve-
ryone in this society has enough to live a dignified life, and 
(2) everyone in this society is entitled to what others have 
voluntarily transferred to them provided that everyone has 
enough to live a dignified life. In this example, sufficiency 
takes priority over entitlement, but the good protected by 
entitlement—a person’s claims to what others have voluntar-
ily transferred to them—nevertheless has independent value.
As a further alternative, and moving beyond the specific 
concern of combining needs-based principles with those 
advocating non-interference in market outcomes, it is con-
ceptually coherent to defend a view of distributive justice 
according to which seemingly contradictory principles 
all matter independently to justice, and where no princi-
ple always takes priority over others. In such a pluralistic 
conception of justice, as espoused, for example, by Walzer 
(1983), which principle takes precedence depends on the 
particular circumstances of the case. While it might be 
8 Respecting Nozickian entitlements will only sometimes be useful to 
improving the fate of the worse-off. For one thing, Nozickian entitle-
ments may sometimes have to be violated—e.g. through the redistri-
bution of wealth—to make the worse-off members of a society bet-
ter off. More subtly, even if economic exchanges are voluntary, they 
may still be inefficient. There are, for example, circumstances where 
a seller is able to extract rent by setting a price above the market-
clearing rate. In such a case, non-intervention in voluntary exchange 
may not be the best way to promote economic value that can then be 
employed to improve the fate of those who are badly-off.7 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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possible to capture the relevant justice trade-offs through 
a simple formula, it is equally possible that no such sim-
ple formula exists. Here it may help to consider an anal-
ogy with deontological theories of normative ethics. Many 
deontological theorists claim that it is important to protect 
rights to non-interference while at the same time recognis-
ing the importance of promoting the general welfare. The 
proper trade-off between these considerations might be quite 
straightforward: for example, it might be permissible to 
infringe a right and harm one individual if this is necessary 
to promote the more significant welfare interests of, say, five 
other individuals. Alternatively, whether it is permissible to 
infringe someone’s rights might depend on a host of different 
factors that interact in potentially complex ways, such that 
no simple formula can be constructed to specify the proper 
trade-off between rights to non-interference and the promo-
tion of welfare under all possible circumstances.
In deontological normative ethics, it is common to 
assume that comprehensive moral theories are too complex 
to be easily attainable, and that moral theorising should 
therefore best proceed in a contextualised and piecemeal 
manner. In contrast, it tends to be an accepted background 
assumption among distributive justice theorists that the theo-
ries that they put forward should be both simple and com-
prehensive. As Walzer puts it: “The deepest assumption of 
most philosophers who have written about [distributive] jus-
tice, from Plato onwards, is that there is one, and only one, 
distributive system that philosophy can rightly encompass” 
(Walzer 1983, p. 5). That is, it is unusual for distributive 
justice theorists to assume that needs-based, merit-based, 
and free market-based principles might all protect values 
that matter independently in ways that are difficult to incor-
porate into a handy formula. However, while unusual, such 
views are not entirely absent from philosophical discussion. 
Besides Walzer’s influential view, pluralistic theories of 
distributive justice are put forward also by Rescher (1966), 
Galston (1980), and Miller (1999).
The overt pluralism in our respondents’ distributive jus-
tice views suggests that business executives are drawn to 
rather complex conceptualisations of distributive justice. 
They appear to believe that distributive justice is governed 
by many different considerations that are not easily distilled 
into a single instructive formula, in much the same way 
that some deontologists think about normative ethics in a 
pluralistic manner. This is a most interesting outcome, and 
one that has not been widely explored by distributive justice 
theorists.
If the pluralism endorsed by business executives fits the 
subject matter of distributive justice, this raises the ques-
tion of what is the most appropriate analytical framework 
for organising and comparing different views of distributive 
justice. In her study of American beliefs about distributive 
justice, Hochschild (1981, p. 52) arranges the five norms of 
justice that she identifies along a continuum, from what she 
describes as the “principle of equality” at one end of the 
scale to the “principle of differentiation” at the other end. 
Schminke et al. (1997) draw a binary distinction between 
what they call “formalist approaches” (associated with Kan-
tian ethics) and “utilitarian approaches” (associated with Jer-
emy Bentham and John Stuart Mill).
Based on our findings, we propose a conceptualisation 
of the distributive justice space as a “field” (after Lewin 
1951; see also Mey 1972). A field is characterised by the 
“operant factors” that are at work in it. For our purposes, the 
relevant operant factors are captured by different principles 
of distributive justice, and include considerations such as an 
individual’s effort, their contribution, or their need. The field 
is constructed by imagining that our data are projected into 
what is mathematically speaking a six-dimensional space, 
with each dimension or axis corresponding to one of the 
six principles of justice. Each of the operant factors exerts 
a force that might vary depending on the context to help 
determine what is distributively just in a given situation. 
Conceptualising distributive justice as a field allows a more 
sophisticated analysis and categorisation of distributive 
justice ideals than the two-dimensional representations of 
Schminke et al. (1997) and Hochschild (1981).
The findings from the cluster analysis that we performed 
on the ranked principles fits well with the proposed field-
theory framework. It groups the respondents of our survey 
into four clusters that assign differential strengths to different 
operant factors such as merit or need. We summarise the 
main characteristics of these four clusters in Table 8, along 
with exemplary quotes drawn from the narrative comments 
in the qualitative component of our study.
Two of the clusters, “relational egalitarians” (Cluster 1) 
and “meritocrats” (Cluster 2), emphasise the importance of 
merit-based principles (equality of opportunity in the case 
of relational egalitarians, and both equality of opportunity 
and desert in the case of meritocrats), but combine this with 
a sufficientarian floor constraint. “Welfare liberals” (Cluster 
3) combine desert, sufficiency, and the maximin principle. 
“Free-marketeers” (Cluster 4) combine equal opportunities, 
desert, and efficiency. Interestingly, entitlement does not 
play a significant role in any of the four clusters, indicative, 
perhaps, that notwithstanding our technical analysis set out 
above, business executives find Nozickian entitlement dif-
ficult to reconcile with merit or needs.
For relational egalitarians (Cluster 1), needs and the 
provision of equal opportunities trump all other con-
siderations, including the consideration that differential 
effort and contribution should be rewarded differentially. 
In their narrative comments, relational egalitarians say 
things like: “Everyone should have the same benefits and 
same opportunities – people should have the same educa-
tional opportunities that allow them to access jobs with 
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fair payments according to their abilities and desires”; “A 
society in which wealth inflation can be greater than sav-
ings potential on minimum wages will never be just – we 
need a method that can address this, which makes property 
and wealth accumulation more accessible objectives for 
all”; and “Markets do not work – either in terms of labour 
or trade – skills in high demand are more easily developed 
Table 8  Characteristics of the four clusters
Relational egalitarians Meritocrats Welfare liberals Free-marketeers
Principles All members of a community 
should have an income that 
is sufficient for them to 
lead a dignified life. Equal 
opportunities are impor-
tant—nobody should be at a 
disadvantage because of the 
circumstances of their birth 
or because of brute bad 
luck. There is no automatic 
entitlement to income or 
wealth. Talent, effort, and 
contribution are not the 
main criteria for allocating 
economic benefits
Some people deserve to 
receive economic benefits 
because of their efforts 
or the demands of the 
job. Equal opportunities 
are important—nobody 
should be at a disadvantage 
because of the circum-
stances of their birth or 
because of brute bad luck. 
There is no automatic 
entitlement to income or 
wealth. The well-off do 
not have an automatic 
obligation to support the 
worst-off. Efficiency is not 
the only criterion by which 
outcomes should be judged
People should be rewarded 
for the contribution that 
they make to their com-
munities, principally with 
a view to making the 
worst-off as well off as 
possible. All members of 
a community should have 
an income that is sufficient 
for them to lead a dignified 
life. There is no automatic 
entitlement to income or 
wealth. Efficiency is not 
the only criterion by which 
outcomes should be judged
Talented people deserve to 
receive economic benefits. 
Everyone should have the 
opportunity to demonstrate 
their ability. Efficiency 
is the main criterion for 
determining how income 
should be allocated. No 
one is automatically enti-
tled to income or wealth. 
The well-off do not have 
an automatic obligation to 
support the worst-off
Exemplary quotes “Everyone should have the 
same benefits and same 
opportunities. – people 
should have the same 
educational opportunities 
that allow them to access 
jobs with fair payments 
according to their abilities 
and desires”; “A society 
in which wealth inflation 
can be greater than savings 
potential on minimum 
wages will never be just – 
we need a method that can 
address this, which makes 
property and wealth accu-
mulation more accessible 
objectives for all”; “Mar-
kets do not work – either 
in terms of labour or trade 
– skills in high demand are 
more easily developed or 
bought (through high cost 
education or work experi-
ence) by those with existing 
wealth or social status”
“All members of society, 
working or not, must be 
guaranteed the satisfac-
tion of their basic needs 
and equal opportunities 
– everyone must have a 
minimum wage that allows 
this – but among the 
workers, the most skilled, 
those who strive the most, 
must have a higher income 
and proportional to their 
commitment”; “All people 
should have opportunities in 
the job market equally, but 
their appointment should 
depend solely on their 
efforts position and not on 
external influences…People 
should only be promoted on 
merit”; “In a society which 
values contribution, effort, 
skill and experience, the 
major focus should be on 
impact and contribution; 
Ideally remuneration should 
be based on merit (e.g., 
qualifications, special abil-
ity, skill shortage, special 
responsibility, commit-
ment, entrepreneurial spirit, 
etc.,)…People who simply 
do not make an effort 
should also only receive the 
absolute subsistence level 
support”
“I agree with the principle 
that guarantees the welfare 
of all society without 
exception, always thinking 
about the dignity of all 
people, including the most 
disadvantaged, but also 
recognising the importance 
of freedom of choice, equal 
opportunities, and encour-
aging talent – we need 
both”; “There must always 
be the principle of collec-
tive responsibility for those 
who have less – we must 
act with social responsibil-
ity towards our neighbour 
who suffers a greater 
degree of poverty, under the 
principle of ‘love for your 
neighbour’”; “Those who 
have more must contribute 
more to society”
“We have a society that 
clamours for the rich to pay 
more – however without 
the rich, there is no wealth 
creation”; “I don’t think 
that income should be 
redistributed automatically 
if the recipients of the 
redistributed income are 
not willing to contribute 
to society – I believe in a 
basic standard of living as 
long as the recipients are 
willing to make a contribu-
tion”; “People will take 
advantage of redistribution 
if standards are not set”; “It 
is too difficult to describe 
in abstract what people 
should or should not be 
paid, it has to be decided 
by the job, the performance 
and what the person is 
worth”; “I strongly believe 
members of society should 
be motivated to work and 
that income redistribution 
removes this motivation”; 
“Let free markets reign! 
– I want a society where 
people are free to win 
according to their skills, 
abilities, efforts and con-
tributions – I accept that in 
such a society, there will be 
some losers”
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or bought through high cost education or work experience 
by those with existing wealth or social status”.
Meritocrats (Cluster 2) are more concerned with rewarding 
productivity, which they combine with a strong focus on equal-
ity of opportunity and sufficiency. In their narrative comments, 
they say things like: “In a society which values contribution, 
effort, skill and experience, the major focus should be on 
impact and contribution”; “All people should have opportuni-
ties in the job market equally, but their appointment should 
depend solely on their effort and not on external influences… 
People should only be promoted on merit”; and “Ideally, remu-
neration should be based on merit (e.g., qualifications, special 
ability, skill shortage, special responsibility, commitment, 
entrepreneurial spirit, etc.)… People who simply do not make 
an effort should also only receive the absolute subsistence level 
support”. Their thought seems to be that, while we should try 
to reward differential contributions differentially, we also have 
some justice obligations based solely on need.
Welfare liberals (Cluster 3) share Rawls’s belief that 
rewards for contribution are desirable as long as the benefits 
spill over to others. They say things like: “I agree with the 
principle that guarantees the welfare of all society without 
exception, always thinking about the dignity of all people, 
including the most disadvantaged, but also recognising the 
importance of freedom of choice, equal opportunities, and 
encouraging talent – we need both”; “Those who have more 
must contribute more to society”; and “There must always 
be the principle of collective responsibility for those who 
have less: we must act with social responsibility towards our 
neighbour who suffers a greater degree of poverty, under the 
principle of ‘love for your neighbour’”.
Finally, “free-marketeers” (Cluster 4) reject the force of 
needs-based principles, instead conceptualising distributive 
justice as based entirely upon merit and economic efficiency. 
As they see it, distributive justice is about rewarding talent 
and ensuring that a functioning price mechanism leads to 
an efficient allocation of resources. They say things like: 
“Without the rich, there is no wealth creation”; “I strongly 
believe members of society should be motivated to work 
and that income redistribution removes this motivation”; and 
“Let free markets reign! I want a society where people are 
free to win according to their skills, abilities, efforts and 
contributions – I accept that in such a society, there will be 
some losers”. These narrative comments appear to reflect 
a sympathy with the principle of entitlement, even if the 
quantitative analysis does not provide equivalent statistical 
support.
Is Distributive Justice Viewed Differently at Society 
and Company levels?
Respondents to our survey see distributive justice as both a 
societal and an organisational issue. Results at society and 
company levels of analysis are highly correlated. Partici-
pants endorsed similar principles at both levels, and the vast 
majority agree or strongly agree with the statement that “cor-
porations should take into account principles of fairness and 
distributive justice when determining their pay strategies”. 
Many economists argue that there should be a division of 
labour between market participants and governments, where 
market participants ought to ensure efficient outcomes, and 
where governments are charged with redistributing wealth 
to turn efficient outcomes into fair ones (Heath 2014). Our 
data suggest most executives believe that companies cannot 
simply outsource matters of distributive justice to govern-
ments to address, for example via the tax system.
One of the main differences between views expressed at 
society and company levels is the higher approval of effi-
ciency at company level. As a group, respondents seem to 
recognise that businesses have an important role to play in 
ensuring that prices paid for labour reflect relative scarcity. 
However, crucially, this is seen as just one consideration 
among others, with sufficiency also receiving a higher 
approval rate at company level.
Do Executives Believe that Societies and Companies 
are Predominantly Just?
By and large, executives do not believe that they live in just 
societies or work for companies that provide just incomes 
according to the principles most highly endorsed. Both at 
company and society levels, the extent to which the widely 
endorsed principles of desert, equality of opportunity, 
and sufficiency are perceived to govern the distribution of 
income falls significantly short of the extent to which this 
is deemed desirable and morally appropriate. At company 
level, the worst perceived shortfall is with respect to suf-
ficiency, where the vast majority of respondents agree that 
the principle should govern the design of pay packages, but 
less than a third believe that it actually does. At society level, 
the most significant perceived shortfall is with respect to 
equality of opportunity—the majority thinks an ideal society 
would be governed by this principle, but less than half agree 
that their society is.
Interestingly, these findings suggest that the role played 
by biases in executives’ views of distributive justice is more 
limited than suggested by Miller (1992). Miller draws atten-
tion to the presence of self-serving biases in perceptions of 
distributive justice in his survey of the empirical literature. 
He reports that how someone assesses the justice of the eco-
nomic system depends on their socioeconomic status. Those 
in lower income brackets tend to think that existing inequali-
ties in income are due primarily to unequal opportunities 
and are therefore unjust, whereas those in higher income 
brackets are more likely to think that existing inequalities 
are due to differential effort and ambition, and are therefore 
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justified (Miller 1992, pp. 585–586). Our findings indicate 
that many business executives are able to recognise that a 
person of lower socioeconomic status might be stuck as a 
result of unequal opportunities.
Lerner (1980) draws attention to another type of bias. He 
shows that what he calls “just world beliefs” tend to distort 
our views about the fairness of the world that we live in. 
According to Lerner, we have a deep-seated need to per-
ceive our social environment as largely just and, therefore, 
controllable. Through a series of experimental studies, he 
shows that this need leads us to explain away injustices, for 
example by unfairly blaming victims, or by fabricating sto-
ries that explain why lucky winners supposedly deserve their 
good luck. In a more recent study, Frank et al. (2015) show 
that just world beliefs affect individual and societal support 
for redistributive principles. They begin with the observa-
tion that individuals and societies that are more sceptical of 
redistribution have much higher faith in the just world notion 
that effort and success are tightly linked in their society. 
They then show that just world beliefs have a causal effect: if 
an individual or a society becomes more confident that mak-
ing an effort will lead to success, this causes the individual 
or the society to become less supportive of redistributive 
principles.
In our study, we found that the vast majority of respond-
ents endorse the redistributive principle of Sufficiency. If 
Frank et al. (2015) are correct, this endorsement is at least 
partly linked to the fact that many respondents do not feel 
that merit-based principles govern the distribution of income 
in the societies that they live in or in the companies that they 
work for (see also Krawczyk 2010).
Do Conceptualisations of Distributive Justice Vary 
by Socio‑demographic Markers?
While some heterogeneity in distributive justice views is 
apparent in the data, there are not many large differences 
in views across demographic markers such as age, gender, 
income, nationality, company type, or industry sector. While 
the views of a free-marketeer differ markedly from the views 
of, say, a welfare liberal, the prevalence of free-marketeers 
and welfare liberals is roughly equal among different age 
groups, income brackets, genders, industry sectors, etc. This 
finding is consistent with earlier empirical findings reported 
by Marshall et al. (1999), who find that distributive justice 
views do not differ significantly between socioeconomic 
classes and different cultures. Having said that, we did 
identify at least some noticeable differences across the four 
clusters (see Table 7). Here, we discuss only the highly sta-
tistical significant differences in the distribution (p < 0.01), 
and comment on the magnitude of these differences.
Among welfare liberals, there are a disproportionally 
large number of Chinese nationals—indeed, on further 
investigation, we discovered that 60% of Chinese partici-
pants are characterised as welfare liberals. Conversely, only 
10% of Swiss nationals fit this category. The ages and indus-
try sectors of welfare liberals are also interesting. They are 
younger than expected—33% are under the age of 35 years 
of age, and a further 30% are between 35 and 40. They also 
have comparatively lower incomes on average, in part likely 
due to their relatively younger age. Welfare liberals are also 
highly represented in the technology sector—39% of tech-
nology executives are found in this cluster. The flipside of 
the high number of Chinese nationals who are welfare lib-
erals is that only a small number (less than 10%) are free-
marketeers. Lastly, the age profile of meritocrats is skewed 
towards older executives—this cluster is under-represented 
in executives under the age of 40.
Summary and Conclusions
We report four main findings. Our first finding is that the 
distributive justice views of business executives are plural-
istic, and that they tend to become more pluralistic as an 
executive’s seniority increases. At both society and company 
levels of analysis, the majority of executives endorse three or 
more principles of justice. At first sight, this pronounced plu-
ralism seems rather puzzling. However, we have advanced a 
number of possible explanations for this phenomenon, and 
we have argued that a novel field-theory framework can be 
used to systematise and compare pronouncedly pluralistic 
views of justice.
Our second finding is that executives endorse similar 
principles at societal and company levels of analysis. Busi-
ness executives do not appear to believe that companies 
should simply leave matters of distributive justice for gov-
ernments to deal with via the tax system. Some economists 
argue for a separation of responsibilities, such that market 
participants are responsible for ensuring efficient economic 
outcomes through their self-interested behaviour, and gov-
ernments are responsible for redistributing wealth to turn 
efficient outcomes into fair ones (Heath 2014). Our research 
suggests that the majority of executives reject this approach, 
believing instead that companies have a more direct role to 
play in bringing about distributive justice. This has impor-
tant practical implications. It suggests that, while senior 
executives may be happy to receive a significant element of 
highly geared performance-based pay for themselves, they 
would also, if pushed, express a belief that all employees in 
their companies should be allowed to make a decent living.
Our third finding is that most business executives live 
in societies and work for companies that they perceive to 
be significantly unjust. Most strikingly, the vast majority of 
executives think that equality of opportunity is an impor-
tant principle of distributive justice at the society level of 
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analysis, but less than half believe that the society that they 
live in is characterised by equal opportunities. At the com-
pany level, many executives endorse a desert-based principle 
of distributive justice, but less than half think that such a 
principle is representative of existing remuneration poli-
cies within their organisations. This finding is of significant 
practical interest as well. It suggests executives should be 
prepared to accept a greater focus on distributive justice in 
company-wide pay policies.
Our fourth finding is that, while distributive justice views 
among executives are relatively homogenous across demo-
graphic markers, some significant variations can never-
theless be identified. Most prominently, respondents who 
are either younger or who live in China are more likely to 
endorse the idea that we should combine a sufficientarian 
floor constraint with desert, thus falling into the cluster of 
welfare liberals.
Managerial and Public Policy Implications
Our research suggests a potential gap between the beliefs 
and behaviours of senior executives when it comes to dis-
tributive justice: folk opinions about what people think in the 
C-suite, derived not unreasonably from behaviours exhibited 
by some prominent senior executives as well as extensive 
media coverage, differ significantly from managers’ actual 
beliefs. Companies should be encouraged to think of ways 
of closing this gap by requiring senior executives to think 
about their own pay in the context of their firms’ overall pay 
policies, particularly how the least well-off employees are 
compensated in comparison with the most well-off.
In the UK, for example, it used to be the case that com-
pany pay policies considered the pay of workers, middle 
managers, and executives as part of a continuum, with grade 
bands, pay spines, and job-evaluation applying across the 
whole spectrum (for further details see Willman and Pepper 
2020). Executive pay was largely determined by reference 
to internal labour markets (and hence internal relativities) 
rather than external labour markets. Today executive and all-
employee pay is generally determined quite separately, paid 
from different expense budgets, in accordance with different 
sets of principles, and using different financial instruments 
(with a significant weighting of variable stock-awards in the 
case of executives compared with fixed cash payments in the 
case of other employees). Determining pay by reference to 
internal labour market relativities meant that company top-
to-bottom pay ratios were generally smaller, and possible 
more distributively just, than they are today. Governments 
have the ability to nudge companies to change their behav-
iour in this regard. Recent moves in the US, UK, and other 
developed economies requiring large companies to publish 
pay ratios are a step in this direction, but an increased public 
policy focus on distributive justice should be encouraged.
Contribution
We add to the empirical literature on distributive justice 
and executive compensation in various ways. By employing 
a unique set of primary data about the beliefs of business 
executives from around the world, we shed light on how 
senior executives think about distributive justice; as far as 
we know, our study is the first to explore the views of high-
level business executives in this way. We also propose a new 
field-theory framework for conceptualising beliefs about 
distributive justice. We argue that, unlike other approaches 
found in the extant literature, this framework can be used to 
capture the pluralistic views about distributive justice which 
our respondents expressed. A field-theory framework might 
be used more widely to represent the complex and context-
dependent theories of justice which we have argued underpin 
such pluralistic views.
Limitations and Implications for Further Research
A key limitation of our study is that we obtained our data 
not by random sampling, but by quota sampling. While only 
random sampling can guarantee that the insights obtained 
are representative of the underlying population, feasibil-
ity constraints make it unlikely that future research will 
be able easily to address this limitation. Further research 
might, however, deal with other limitations of our study. As 
we argue above, the pluralism in executives’ justice views 
suggests that they endorse complex theories of distributive 
justice that incorporate seemingly contradictory principles 
whose force might vary depending on context. Our study is 
unable to shed much light on what executives think about 
the relationship between the different principles that they 
endorse: the only question in our survey that pertains to 
this issue asks respondents, rather crudely, to rank the ques-
tionnaire’s six principles of distributive justice from most 
preferred to least preferred. While forced ranking tells us 
something about which principles are perceived to be most 
central to distributive justice, future empirical research—
conducted, for instance, in the form of interviews or using 
focus groups—might aim to capture more nuances in the 
perceived relationship between the different principles. If 
executives’ views are as pluralistic as our study suggests, 
further research might help give shape to the pluralism 
which is at work, which could in turn be captured by the 
field-theory framework we have proposed.
Future research might also investigate how the distribu-
tive justice views of business executives compare to those of 
the general public, perhaps by using the same questionnaire 
we used for our study. In the “Discussion” section, we make 
some limited comparisons between the views of business 
executive and those of the general public based on secondary 
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literature. Less guarded comparisons are possible only if the 
data collection instruments are matched.
Conclusion
In conclusion, business executives are frequently depicted as 
tough-minded individuals with a winner-takes-all mentality. 
Because they have worked hard and achieved professional 
success, business elites assume, or so the conventional think-
ing goes, that everyone else can achieve equivalent success 
if they work hard as well. Our findings indicate that this 
picture of executives’ beliefs is too simplistic. Many execu-
tives are not convinced that they live in just societies or work 
for just companies. Most endorse pluralistic views of justice 
that balance considerations of merit with considerations of 
need. The majority believe that matters of distributive justice 
should be dealt with both at a societal and company levels. 
This suggests that executives are more sensitive to issues 
of distributive justice than is frequently assumed, which in 
turn has important practical implications, some of which 
have been sketched-out in this paper. We hope that our work 
will encourage further discussion about distributive justice 
among business executives, and spur companies into think-
ing more about distributive justice when determining cor-
porate pay policies.
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